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The paper studies the relationship between inequality and economic growth.
This is done in a two sector model of endogenous growth with agents characterized
by heterogeneity of factor endowments. The private sector consists of a large number
of competitive ¯rms who produce the only ¯nal good in the economy. This good
is both consumable as well as accumulable. The government is seen to produce a
productive factor interpreted as infrastructure. Infrastructure is both nonrival and
accumulable. Infrastructural services °ow into the production of infrastructural
stocks as well as the ¯nal good. Capital used for infrastructural production is
¯nanced by the government by taxing capital income. The choice of the growth
rate is determined by the tax rate on capital income. We study the choice of the
economy's growth rate under a median voter democracy. The results show that
inequality of the distribution of capital does not hamper growth.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, Infrastructure, Nonrival input, Welfare, Politi-
cal equilibrium.
JEL classi¯cation: O41, H54, H41, D61
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Di®erences in the rates of growth among economies is a phenomenon that growth theorists
have explained in di®erent ways. They have attributed these to the di®erences in the rate
of accumulation of human capital (Lucas 1988), to human fertility (Becker, Murphy &
Tamura), to learning by doing (Arrow 1962), to levels of government expenditure (Barro
1990), international trade (Grossman & Helpman 1991) and research and development
(Romer 1990), etc.
The lack of adequate infrastructure has been a major impediment to the growth
process in the developing economies. It has been noted by a large number of economists,
that lack of such a critical sector has not only prevented many economies from attaining
high growth, but also in many cases prevented the growth being sustained over a period of
time. Lack of infrastructure also results in lower the productivity of factors of production
and lowers the income and welfare of their owners. This sentiment was echoed in the
World Bank Development Report(1994) with reference to China. It was estimated that
the annual economic cost of inadequate transport in China is at least 1% of its GNP.
The India Infrastructure Report (1996) reiterated a similar concern and recommended
the government of India to take steps to raise the level of investment in infrastructure.
It was projected that the amount of investment in infrastructure needs to be at least 7%
of the GDP to ensure that the economy does not stagnate. Sanchez-Robles(1998) ¯nds
infrastructure to be positive and signi¯cant factor behind growth.
Barro(1990), in his seminal paper, ¯rst tried to capture the role of infrastructure
on growth. In his paper, publicly provided infrastructural services enter as inputs in the
production process. The provision of infrastructure allowed the economy to experience
perpetual growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) used a variant of Barro's model to study
the e®ect of heterogeneous agents on the provision of infrastructure and growth.
We extend Barro's model to allow infrastructure to be accumulated over time. Hence
the economy we study has two growth inducing instruments: physical capital and in-
frastructure. This feature makes our model a \two-sector" model as opposed to the
one-sector model of Barro and Alesina and Rodrik. The government is treated as the
sole owner of all infrastructural stocks. This conforms largely to the reality of developing
economies such as India. Alternatively, one can also regard infrastructure to be a non-excludable public good. The scarcity of this stock is seen as a major constraining factor
in the process of growth. A major di®erence between our work and that of Barro(1990) is
that we introduce an explicit technology for augmenting the infrastructural stock. This
technology is controlled entirely by the government. As in Alesina & Rodrik and Barro,
however, the infrastructural service is provided freely to ¯rms in the private sector which
combine it with other factor inputs to produce a single private good. A ¯nal major depar-
ture of our approach from theirs is in the treatment of infrastructure as a nonrival input
entering simultaneously into the production of the private good as well as the process
controlling changes in the infrastructural stock. Some of these features of infrastructure
may also be found in Truong (1993-a, 1993-b).
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) pointed out that while the government of an economy
might have noble interests, the political pressures in an economy might force the gov-
ernment to choose policies which are dictated by the majority of the population. Hence
a representative agent economy might not be an ideal setting to study the choice of in-
frastructural provision by a government. Following their approach we allow the economy
to be comprised of heterogeneous agents. The agents in the economy di®er in terms of
their endowments of factors. The preferences of agents over the provision of infrastructure
di®ers because of the heterogeneity of factor ownership.
Subject to the above characterization of infrastructure, the analytical exercise car-
ried out in this paper is the same as in Alesina & Rodrik. Application of the Median
Voter Theorem1 is used in this set up to study the choice of growth rate in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section spells out the model. The e®ect
of factor endowments on preferred policies is discussed in Section 3 and this is followed
by the outcome under majority voting in Section 4. Section 5 studies the implications for
growth if unskilled labor is required in the production process of both the ¯nal good and
infrastructure. Section 6 gives the concluding comments.
1The Median Voter Theorem is used here to capture the notion that, in a democratic society the
government is in°uenced by the preferences of the majority of its population.2 The Model
In our model, there are three inputs required for the production of the only ¯nal good in
the economy. Unskilled labor(L) and capital(K)2 are two inputs for which proper markets
exist. The other input is infrastructure(G), for which no market exists. The government
is the sole producer of this input. It generates the funds for this purpose by taxing capital
income. The ¯nal good is consumable as well as accumulable as capital.
There are a large number of competitive ¯rms, having the same constant returns
to scale production function for producing the ¯nal good Y . The aggregate production
function of the economy in every period can described by
Y (t) = A[G(t)L(t)]
1¡a[KY(t)]
a
where Y (t) is the instantaneous output °ow, L(t) and KY(t) are the aggregate employ-
ments of labor and capital for the production of Y . A is a technological shift parameter
and G(t) is the °ow of infrastructure, assumed to be provided free of user cost to all ¯rms
(as in Barro).
We assume that labor is supplied inelastically and normalize its aggregate value to
1. Therefore, we can write the aggregate production function as
Y (t) = AG(t)
1¡a[KY(t)]
a (1)
The government produces infrastructure, which we view as another accumulable
factor. The °ow of infrastructure is assumed to be a non-rival input into all production.
In order to add to the stock of infrastructure, the government uses the existing stock
of infrastructure and capital. It buys capital services from the market by taxing capital
income. All capital income earners are taxed at the same rate. The technology governing





b; 3 0 < b < 1 (2)
2Capital here is viewed to be the sum total of Human and Physical capital.
3We assume that unskilled labor is not used in the production of infrastructure. It is typically seen
that infrastructure is very capital intensive and does not rely heavily on unskilled labor. However, thewhere B is a technological shift parameter and KG(t) is the amount of capital employed
in the production of infrastructure. At any moment in time the stock of infrastructure is
G(t) and the °ow of the service emanating from it is assumed to be G(t) also. Assuming
a balanced budget for the government at all points in time, we have
KG(t) = ¿(t)K(t):4
where ¿(t) is the tax rate on capital income and K(t) is the aggregate capital stock of the
economy at t. It follows that
KY (t) = (1 ¡ ¿(t))K(t)
The economy consists of a ¯nite number of agents indexed by i. As in Alesina
& Rodrik, household agents, or simply agents, in the economy are identi¯ed by their
endowments. The ith agent is endowed with Ki
0 units of capital and li units of labor.
The endowment of labor is constant over time however agents can decide to accumulate
capital over time. We assume that the agents behave competetively in all markets and







where ¾i 2 [0;1): This individual speci¯c parameter represents the endowment ratio of
labor and capital of the ith agent relative to the endowment ratio for the economy as a
whole(since the aggregate value of labor has been normalized to 1). A person with high
¾ is capital poor and vice versa. It may be noted that di®erences in the endowment of
capital is the only cause of income disparity among the agents. The variable ¾i is used to
index the agents and characterize the equilibrium later on. It will turn out that ¾i is a
constant over time for each i. Having speci¯ed the model, we can now study the problem
faced by the individual agents.
results qualitatively remain the same if we allow for labor to be used in the production process of both
the sectors.
4The tax revenue of the government at any instant is ¿(t)r(t)K(t). With the tax revenue the govern-
ment can buy ¿(t)K(t) units of capital. Notice, the way tax is utilized, amounts to physical expropriation
of capital by the government. This method of ¯nancing capital input gives the government access to a
certain proportion of the capital stock of the economy, at all points in time.
5It should be noted that the sequence of wages and rentals depend on the path of tax rate, since
infrastructure a®ects the productivity of both the factors.3 Factor ownership and Policy preferences
We will begin by studying the problem faced by a generic agent in the economy. The
agent carries out his utility maximization excercise subject to a budget constraint which
depends on his factor endowments and the sequence of wage rates and rental rates. We
restrict our attention to the class of balanced growth paths only, i.e., paths along which
all variables grow at constant rates.
Proposition 1 Along the steady state equilibrium growth path, an agent's capital stock(Ki),
the aggregate capital stock of the economy(K), the stock of infrastructure(G) and the out-
put of the ¯nal good(Y ) grow at the same rate as the agent's rate of growth of consumption(Ci),
i.e.,
®Ci = ®Ki = ®K = ®G = ®Y
where ®'s denote the rates of growth of these variables.
Proof: See the appendix.
All agents choose to save and accumulate capital in order to be able to have a steady
growth in their consumption. Since all agents recieve the same rate of return on their
savings they all accumulate capital at the same rate. The tax rate on capital determines
the level of investment in infrastructure. The agents behave competitively in all markets
therefore they don't internalize the impact of tax rate on their future wage rates and
rental rates. If a political party or government was to decide the tax rate they would
take into account the bene¯cial e®ect of capital tax on infrastructure. We now proceed
to study the problem faced by a social planner if he was trying to maximize the welfare
of the ith agent.
Every agent might have a di®erent preference concerning the provision of infrastruc-


























¡½t = 0; (6)
lim
t!1¸2(t)e
¡½t = 0; (7)
G(0) = G0, and Ki(0) = Ki
0. ½ denotes the rate at which the agent discounts future
utility and logCi(t) is the instantaneous utility function of the agent7. ¸1(t) and ¸2(t)
are the costate variables associated with Ki(t)and G(t) respectively:
Proposition 2 The optimal tax rate for the ith agent will satisfy the following equations:
¿i
1 ¡ ¿i =
Ã
®i + ½















½ + ®i (GG)
Proof: See the appendix.
The (KK) schedule gives the locus of ( ¿i
1¡¿i;®i) combinations along which the rate
of growth of consumption demanded by the agent i is equal to the rate of growth of
6We ¯nd it convenient to express the aggregate capital stock of the economy as a function of the
ith agent's endowment parameter ¾i. It follows from Proposition 1 that ¾i does not vary over time.
Hence the aggregate capital stock of the economy K(t) = (¾i
li )Ki(t). The income of the ith agent
at any instant t after some manipulations can be written as a function of aggregate output, that is,
Y i(t) = Y (t)[a + (1 ¡ a)=¾i]li.
7The results we derive will hold for the whole class of utility functions with constant elasticity of
marginal utility.infrastructure. Notice, that the form of this relationship depends on the ith agent's
endowment parameter ¾i. The (KK) curve is only a partial characterization of the optimal
balanced growth path since along this curve we have only considered the rate at which
agents would want their consumption to grow. For overall optimum ®G too must be chosen
similarly. This requirement gives rise to another locus of ( ¿i
1¡¿i;®i) combinations called
the (GG) schedule. The (GG) curve is independant of ¾i. For a graphical illustration of
the (KK) and (GG) schedules see Figure 1.
Proposition 3 There exists a strictly positive and unique solution (®i;¿i) to the ith
agent's problem.
Proof: See the appendix.
The (KK) curve must rotate towards right with a rise in ¾i:This means that a person
with a higher ¾i will choose a higher ¿i
1¡¿i and hence a higher ®i and ¿i (refer to Figure
1)8. Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 4 The ideal value of ¿i is a monotone increasing function of ¾i.
Proof: See the appendix.
Notice that in our model a higher tax rate on capital income is associated with a
higher rate of growth contrary to the case in Alesina and Rodrik. This follows from the
fact that in their model the only growth inducing instrument was capital. Consequently,
taxation of capital income above the growth maximizing rate was a disincentive for saving
given that the rate of return on savings was r(t) ¡ ¿. This resulted in a lower rate of
growth of capital and output. In our model however, the tax on capital income does not
create such a distortionary e®ect. As we have already seen from the (KK) schedule, the
overall rate of return on savings is in fact the rental rate of capital i.e., r(t): Thus, a tax
on capital income has no negative e®ect on growth. A perfect capitalist i.e., an agent
with ¾i = 0 also prefers a strictly positive tax rate.
Proposition 5 The preferences of agents are single peaked in tax rates(¿i):
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 5 says that each agent has a unique optimal tax rate. Deviation from
8A higher value of ¿
i
1¡¿i implies a higher value for ¿i as ¿
i
1¡¿i is a monotonic and increasing function
of ¿i.this optimal tax rate in any direction causes a decline in the level of the agent's welfare.
4 Policy Choice
Now let us see what the political equilibrium of the economy is going to be. To this e®ect
we wish to make following comments:
(1) Suppose there are two political parties( P1 and P2 ) ¯ghting an election at any point
in time t. Each party has to choose a tax rate as its election stance. So the strategy set of
each party is S1 = S2 = [0;1] . Assume that both the parties are aware of the distribution
of preferred policies of the agents in the economy. If the parties play a simultaneous move
game where the objective of each party is to maximize the number of votes, then it is
easy to show that s¤
p = ¿m ; p = 1;2, is the unique Nash Equilibrium of this game, where
¿m is the preferred tax of the median voter.
(2) Suppose there are more than two (say N) political parties. The strategy set of each
party Sp = [0;1] 8 p . The parties choose tax rates (sp 2 Sp) simultaneously as their
election stance. Assume that the choice over tax rate is made by a pairwise comparison
under a majority voting rule. The Median Voter Theorem can be applied to this case
because the preferences of agents are single peaked and there exists a monotonic rela-
tionship between agents' endowments and their preferred policies. The outcome of the
majority voting will depend upon the preference of the median voter. Notice that this is
the kind of voting procedure referred to by Alesina and Rodrik.
Thus under the above two kinds of election procedure, the economy's political choice
of the tax rate will be the median voter's preferred tax rate. This will depend on the
endowment parameter of the median voter ¾m.
Now if capital is distributed in a highly inegalitarian manner, the median voter's
endowment parameter ¾i would be high. Thus, Proposition 4 implies that the median
voter's choice of the tax rate would be high. This is shown in Figure 1, where KK1
corresponds to ¾m
1 and KK2 corresponds to ¾m
2 (¾m
1 < ¾m
2 ). In addition, since the ideal
policies are constant over time and the distribution of factors is also time invariant, it
does not matter whether voting takes place only once at time zero or is repeated every
period.In Alesina and Rodrik(1994) higher inequality in a society resulted in a more than
desirable tax rate on capital dampening incentive for savings. This resulted in a lower rate
of accumulation of capital and lower growth. Bertola too had derived a similar result.
However, it has been empirically seen that higher tax on capital leads to higher rates
of growth. Perotti (1996) has noted this fact in his cross-sectional study on tax rates
and growth. A recent study by Uhlig & Yanagawa (1996) also shows the possibility of a
higher capital income tax giving rise to a higher growth rate in an overlapping generations
economy. In our model we reach a similar conclusion in the context of a dynastic set up.
5 Labor used in the production process of both the
goods
In this section, we will study the preference of agents if unskilled labor was required in
the production process of both the ¯nal good and infrastructure. The allocation of two
factors across two sectors makes the analysis a bit more complicated but the results are
similar to those derived in the previous sections.
Suppose that in addition to the tax on capital income the government also sets a tax
on unskilled labor9. The government sets a proportion of labor hours, which have to be
contributed by all agents for the production of infrastructure. The production functions










where Á is the tax rate on labor. From the above equations, we can interpret that
infrastructure clubs with labor to increase the e±ciency units of labor10. In order to
9In a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium, the agents would voluntarily want to utilize a part of
their labor in the production of infrastructure.
10We now have a model very similar to Rebelo (1991). The interpretation of e®ective units of labor is
a bit di®erent though, as all agents get the same bene¯t from infrastructure in terms of scaling up his
e±ciency units of labor. The exponents of labor has been set in this manner to simplify the algebra.calculate the preferred choice of tax policy of the ith agent, a similar exercise (like the
one in section 3) is carried out. We maximize (4) subject to
dKi(t)
dt
= r(t)[1 ¡ ¿
i(t)]K




(9), Ki(0) = Ki
0 and G(0) = G0. Along the balance growth path, Ci, Ki, K and G grow
at the same rate and the tax rates Á and ¿ are constant.
Now, an optimal allocation of both labor and capital has to made between the two
sectors. In an e±cient allocation for agent i, the loss in income due to any tax is equal


























The other e±ciency condition is dynamic in nature. It is regarding the decision to invest







An alternative to investing in one more unit of capital is to accumulate 1=p(t) units of
infrastructure, where p(t)11 is the relative value of infrastructure with respect to capital.
An additional unit of infrastructure increases the e±ciency units of labor and its












At optimum, the two rates of returns have to be the same. p(t) is constant given (K=g)
























(1¡b)a and x = 1
b¡a+1.
A person with lower endowment of capital would therefore prefer lower
(1¡¿i)K(t)
(1¡Ái)g(t)
ratio in Y sector which would imply a higher rate of return on capital. The rate of growth






ib(1¡a)x ¡ ½ . (18)
Agents with lower endowment of capital prefer higher growth rates. The intuition for this
is fairly simple. Consider an agent with negligible amount of capital. He would prefer
higher capital tax viz a viz tax on labor to attain growth. This would imply a higher
\e±ciency units of labor" to capital ratio in the Y -sector and higher rate of return on
capital, thus higher growth.
If voting takes place only regarding the choice of growth rates then, it is clear that
economies with higher inequality in distribution of capital (i.e., higher ¾m) would choose
a higher rate of growth. However, growth can be achieved by choice of a combination
of taxes (¿;Á). If voting takes place over this (¿;Á) plane, the outcome is not easy to
predict12. The standard Median Voter Theorem does not hold for voting on two variables.
In cases where voting takes place over the (¿;Á) plane, there may be cases where
the economy ends up choosing tax and growth rates which are not in keeping with the
median voter's preferences. Such an outcome however would be a result of certain °aws
in the political choice process.
12Restrictions on preferences would be needed for the Median Voter Theorem to hold in multidimen-
sional voting problems.6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the inequality in the distribution of factor
endowments does not constrain growth as long as the tax revenues are invested in a
growth inducing instrument. In fact, we ¯nd that higher inequality in the distribution of
capital leads to a higher rate of growth. Even when labor is required for the production
of infrastructure, we have seen that agents with lower endowment of capital prefer higher
growth rates.
However, we observe that in reality democratic societies with high inequality can
grow at low rates. Casual empiricism suggests at least two explanations for it. First, in
a country like India, a large fraction of the population living below poverty has a high
demand for government provided free lunches. This forces the government to opt for
the Alesina and Rodrik, Barro variety of °ow infrastructure only. In this situation, the
Alesina and Rodrik result could apply as government services only has level e®ects and
no growth e®ect.
We have noted that in case voting decisions take place over two dimensions, the out-
come of the voting cannot be predicted using the Median Voter Theorem. The outcome of
the political process in such a scenario may lead to lower rates of growth than preferred by
the majority of the population. There may also be other institutional factors responsible
for retarding growth. It has been seen that in societies with high inequality of income
distribution, the institutions tend to be underdeveloped in terms of both their e±ciency
as well as accountability. The Politics of such countries also come under severe pressure
from the rich capitalist lobbies, to adopt policies to suit their vested interests. Also,
the poorer section of the population typically tend to be unorganized and uninformed,
compared to their capital rich counterparts. This would imply in turn that the model of
democracy in countries such as India does not fall within the purview of the Median Voter
Theorem. Barro(1999), in his empirical study ¯nds that higher inequality tends to harm
growth in poorer economies while in richer economies higher inequality leads to higher
rate of growth13. This suggests that in an underdeveloped economy with high inequality,
the richer section of the society is able to circumvent the democratic process quite easily.
13In Barro(1999) economies with per capita income above 2070(1985 dollars) show a positive relation-
ship between inequality and growth.However, it would be erroneous to conclude that these economies show sluggish growth
because the median voter prefers policies to which lead to lower rate of growth.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:

































where ½ denotes the rate at which the agent discounts future utility and logCi(t) is the
instantaneous utility function of the agent. The control variables for the agent is Ci(t)
the state variable is Ki(t). e ¸1(t) denotes the costate variable associated with Ki(t). The
current value Hamiltonian of the ith agent is
H
i(t) = logC





where e ¸1(t) is the costate variables associated with Ki(t): The necessary condition for
optimum with respect to consumption is
@H
i(t)=@C
i(t) = 0 or e ¸1(t) = 1=C
i(t):Taking total derivatives and rearranging we get the following relationship between the








Let ®Ci and ®e ¸1 denote the rate of growth of Ci and e ¸1. The above condition can be








®Ci = r(t)[1 ¡ ¿(t)] ¡ ½:
Along balanced growth paths ¿ and ®Ci are constants. This implies r(t) = r and ¿(t) = ¿
for all t. Thus, the rate of growth of consumption of every agent same regardless of his
initial endowment of capital or ¾i. The transversality condition and the budget constraint
imply that
®Ci = ®Ki = r[1 ¡ ¿] ¡ ½.
where ®Ki denote the rates of growth of capital stock of the ith agent. If all agents
accumulate capital at the same rate then the aggregate capital stock of the economy
will be growing at the same rate i.e., ®K = ®Ki, where ®K denotes the rate of growth
of capital stock of the economy. Constancy of r implies (K=G) ratio is constant over
time. Hence ®K = ®G along balanced growth paths where ®G denotes the rate of growth
of infrastructure. From equation (1) it follows easily that the rate of growth of output
®Y = ®G.
Proof of Proposition 2:









where ¸1(t) and ¸2(t) are the costate variables associated with Ki(t)and G(t) and si =
[a+(1¡a)=¾i]li: The necessary condition for optimum with respect to consumption yields







(22)First order condition with respect to Ki(t) is
d¸1(t)
dt
= ½¸1(t) ¡ @H
i(t)=@K
i(t) .





We can simplify the above expression by substituting for si and writing Ki(t) as li
¾iK(t).
After necessary manipulations we get
®Ci = [a¾
i + (1 ¡ a)]r ¡ ½: (23)
First order condition with respect to G(t) gives us
d¸2(t)
dt
= ½¸2(t) ¡ @H
i(t)=@G(t):
From equation (22) we can write the above condition as
®¸2 = ½ ¡ ®G
(1 ¡ a)(1 ¡ ¿i)
a¿i ¡ (1 ¡ b)®G. (24)
Taking total derivatives of (22) and dividing through to get rates of growth we get,
®¸2 = ¡®G: (25)
Substituting in (24) we get
¿i






















1¡a. Multiplying the above two equalities we get
¿i
1 ¡ ¿i =
Ã
®Ci + ½








Along balanced growth paths ®Ci = ®G = ®i therefore equations (26) and (27) reduce to
our (GG) and (KK) schedules respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3:Write the (KK) equation as
¿i











b: The function h is convex in ® and exhibits fol-
lowing properties: h(0;¾i) = 0: The ¯rst partial derivative with respect to ®; h1(®;¾i) =
h(®;¾i)[ 1
(1¡a)(®+½) + 1
b®]. There fore h1(0;¾i) = 0: and The second partial derivative with





(®+½)®] > 0 since (1¡a)
and b are less than 1. Hence lim®!1 h(®;¾i) = 1. Write the (GG) equation as
¿i







½+®: The function f is concave in ® and exhibits following properties:








0(0) > 0 and lim®!1 f
0(®) = 0. De¯ne
a new function z(®;¾i)
z(®;¾
i) = f(®) ¡ h(®;¾
i) (28)
From the properties of functions f and h it follows that there exists an ² su±ciently
small such that z(²) > 0: Also as ® ! 1, z(:) ! ¡1: Since z(:) is a continuous and
strictly concave function, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists
a unique ®i > 0 such that z(®i) = 0; or, f(®i) = h(®i;¾i). Since z(:) is a strictly concave
function, it follows that ®i is unique. The associated unique choice of ¿i is established by
plugging ®i into (GG) or (KK) equation. Note that the pair (®i = 0;¿i = 0) also solves
the reduced form equations (KK) and (GG). However, for ¿i = 0 does not constitute a
maximum. Hence (®i = 0;¿i = 0) does not qualify as a solution.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Notice the partial derivative of function z() with respect to ¾i is z2(®;¾i) = ¡h2(®;¾i) >
0. Therefore the solution to z(®;¾i) = 0, ®(¾i) is an increasing function of ¾i.
Proof of Proposition 5:
It is easy to check that Hi(t) is strictly concave in Ci(t) and ¿i(t), given ¸1(t), ¸2(t): Hence,
by Cass(1965), the ¯rst order conditions characterize a unique optimal path provided the
following transversality conditions hold. In the class of balanced growth paths there is
only one solution (®i > 0) to the ith agent's problem. Hence, agent i's preferences are
single peaked in ¿i.References
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